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A NEW DEAL FOR END USERS? LESSONS FROM A FRENCH
INNOVATION IN THE REGULATION OF
INTEROPERABILITY
JANE WINN* & NICOLAS JONDET**
ABSTRACT
In 2007, France created the Regulatory Authority for Technical
Measures (l’Autorité de Régulation des Mesures Techniques or
ARMT), an independent regulatory agency charged with promoting
the interoperability of digital media distributed with embedded
“technical protection measures” (TPM), also known as “digital rights
management” technologies (DRM). ARMT was established in part to
rectify what French lawmakers perceived as an imbalance in the
rights of copyright owners and end users created when the European
Copyright Directive (EUCD) was transposed into French law as the
“Loi sur le Droit d’Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de
l’Information” (DADVSI). ARMT is both a traditional independent
regulatory agency and a novel attempt to develop a new governance
structure at the national level to address global information economy
challenges. The fear that other national governments might follow
suit seems to have helped to cool enthusiasm for TPM among some
businesses. This Article notes parallels between the limitations
imposed on ARMT and those imposed on the first modern independ-
ent regulatory agencies that emerged in the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Using history as a guide,
it is not surprising that the ARMT’s exercise of authority has been
limited during its early years; it remains possible that ARMT may
become a model for legislation in other countries. It took decades
before the first American independent regulatory agencies exercised
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real authority, and their legitimacy was not established beyond ques-
tion until Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” Even though information society
institutions may evolve quickly, national governments are sure to
require more time to develop effective, legitimate ways to ensure that
global information and communication technology (ICT) standards
conform to their national social policies.
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1. Press Release, Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Installation de
l’Autorité de Régulation des Mesures Techniques (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.armt.fr/IMG/
pdf/installationARMT.pdf [hereinafter Press Release]; Nicolas Jondet, DRM Watchdog
Established in France (Décret n  2007-510 du 4 Avril 2007), FRENCH-LAW.NET, Apr. 11, 2007,
http://french-law.net/drm-watchdog-established-in-france-decret-2007-510-4-avril-2007.html.
2. Press Release, supra note 1.
3. Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Content:
Moving Forward Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 39, 40 (2006).
4. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17,
2186 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. For an explanation of the differences
between DRMs and TPMs, see OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CANADA, FACT SHEET:
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL PROTECTION MEASURES (2006), http://www.
priv.gc.ca/fs-fi/02_05_d_32_e.cfm.
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, France created the Regulatory Authority for Technical
Measures (l‘Autorité de Régulation des Mesures Techniques or
ARMT), an independent regulatory agency charged with promoting
interoperability of media technologies used by French consumers.1
ARMT is both a traditional independent regulatory agency and a
novel attempt to develop a governance structure to address infor-
mation economy challenges.2 The growth of digital media and the
expansion of global electronic communications networks have
revolutionized the ways in which information is created, distributed,
and accessed.3 Although these changes have made possible many
new forms of creativity and processes for exchanging ideas, they
have also dramatically facilitated the unauthorized reproduction
and distribution of copyrighted works. The ensuing mass copyright
infringement threatened traditional business models in the music,
film, broadcasting, and video game industries. In an attempt to
stifle such piracy, the media industry has implemented various
strategies with a predilection for technological solutions and for the
toughening of copyright laws. Indeed, content producers have
embedded technologies in media software and hardware to control
the way in which consumers can access, use, and copy digital media.
These technologies are commonly known as “Digital Rights Manage-
ment” systems (DRMs) but are referred to in legal instruments as
“Technological Protection Measures” (TPMs).4 Unfortunately, for the
media industry, TPMs are inherently fallible as ingenious hackers
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5. Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM.
J. COMP. L. 323, 331 (2004).
6. This includes the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, both adopted in Geneva. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4;
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186
U.N.T.S. 203.
7. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8. Council Directive 2001/29, Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2001/29].
Like the DMCA, this Directive implements the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. See id. at 11.
9. See generally Nicola Lucchi, Countering the Unfair Play of DRM Technologies, 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91 (2007).
10. Law No. 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
always find ways to circumvent them.5 In an effort to offset this
vulnerability, copyright industries have successfully lobbied inter-
national institutions and national governments to introduce legal
prohibitions on tampering with TPMs. The principles of the legal
protection of TPMs, and of the prohibition of their circumvention,
were first set in the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Internet Treaties,6 adopted in 1996. Anticircumvention
provisions have subsequently been implemented in national laws,
such as the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998,7
and regional instruments, such as the 2001 European Copyright
Directive (EUCD).8 The resulting legal landscape has enabled the
widespread deployment of TPMs in digital content distribution.
Soon enough, however, the unintended consequences of TPMs for
consumers became apparent. Chief amongst them were the facts
that TPMs challenged consumers’ ability to benefit from copyright
limitations, such as fair use,9 and that they undermined the port-
ability of digital media due to a lack of interoperability between
competing technologies. The international copyright framework, as
designed in the mid-1990s, did not address issues that materialized
only a decade later. And this is precisely when France belatedly
decided to abide by its international obligations and grant legal
protection to TPMs.
In an original attempt to address consumer concerns raised by
the widespread use of TPMs, the French Parliament passed the “Loi
Relative au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la Société
l’Information” (DADVSI),10 which created the ARMT and transposed
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[Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2006, p.11529. See generally Nicolas Jondet, La France
v. Apple: Who’s the DADVSI in DRMs?, 3 SCRIPTED 473 (2006), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/
ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/jondet.asp.
11. Jondet, supra note 10, at 475.
12. See, e.g., European Digital Rights, France: ARMT Was Useless, EDRI-GRAM, Jan. 14,
2009, http://www.edri.org/edri-gram/number7.1/armt-useless.
13. Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1213-15, 1233-36 (1986). 
the EUCD.11 The DADVSI therefore departs from other European
and international instruments as it tries to counterbalance the
rights granted to copyright owners, through the protection of TPMs,
with guarantees for consumers of cultural goods, notably in terms
of interoperability of these TPMs. This Article will consider the
political pressures and compromises that led to the establishment
of ARMT and the scope of its mandate in order to assess its viability
as a legislative model. The initial grant of authority to ARMT was
narrow. Since its formation, it has carried out its mission cautiously,
giving rise to criticism that it may never deliver on its original
promise.12 Notwithstanding its modest short-term impact, ARMT
may one day be seen as an important experiment in the regulation
of technological innovation. If ARMT ultimately becomes a model for
regulatory innovations, then it would resemble the first modern
independent regulatory agency, the U.S. Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), which at first appeared to be a failure but later
became a very influential model.13
And although independent regulatory authorities play different
roles under French and U.S. administrative law, this Article will
consider the status of ARMT under French administrative law in
light of some significant historical developments in U.S. administra-
tive law. The French legislature’s original mandate for ARMT was
challenging: to protect the French public’s interest in preserving
limitations on copyrights and the interoperability of TPMs. To ful-
fill its interoperability mandate, ARMT may require the provider
of a particular technology to disclose proprietary information to a
competitor to permit said competitor to achieve interoperability
between the two technologies. Mandating disclosures by dominant
producers represents an ex post focus on the problem, whereas
promoting the use of technical standards represents an ex ante
approach to the problem. This Article will therefore also consider
2009] A NEW DEAL FOR END USERS? 553
14. See generally Evangelos Vardakas, Enter. Directorate-Gen., European Comm’n, The
Role of Government in Standards Settings: A European View (Dec. 11, 2002), in VADEMECUM
ON EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION, Nov. 15, 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/standards_
policy/vademecum/doc/standards_setting_governance_ev.pdf.
15. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 96TH CONG., GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR
THE FUTURE (1992); CARL CARGILL, OPEN SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION: A BUSINESS APPROACH
26, 29-32 (1997).
16. CARGILL, supra note 15, at 27-28. The OECD defines economic regulation as
intervention “in market decisions such as pricing, competition, market entry, or exit” designed
to increase efficiency, and social regulation as intervention to “protect public interests such
as health, safety, the environment, and social cohesion.” ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM:
SYNTHESIS 6 (1997).
17. Peter J. May, Social Regulation, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 156, 161, 165-66 (Lester Salamon ed., 2002).
18. Uday M. Apte & Hiranya K. Nath, Size, Structure and Growth of the U.S. Information
Economy, in MANAGING IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 17-19 (Annals of Info. Syst., Vol. 1,
2007).
the costs and benefits of using technical standards to preserve
copyright limitations and promote TPM interoperability even
though ARMT is not currently authorized to regulate the use of
technical standards to achieve its goals. Despite ARMT’s lack of
authority, within the larger context of EU legislation in the area of
standards, ARMT might serve as a legislative model for an agency
with such authority in the future.14
In competitive markets, the use of technical standards is gen-
erally voluntary and market participants with little or no govern-
ment oversight determine the degree of standardization.15 In such
contexts, government intervention may be limited to ensuring
the security of contract and property rights, preventing fraud or
anticompetitive behavior, or promoting the accurate disclosure of
information. In the context of social regulation, however, the inter-
action between law and standards may be significantly different
because government may require market participants to internal-
ize certain costs they would otherwise prefer to externalize.16 The
government may mandate compliance with technical standards,
provide reference standards to signal regulator expectations, or
develop the standards directly.17 With the rapid growth of the
information economy,18 conflicts between social regulations and the
norms implicit in technical standards for information and communi-
cations technologies (ICTs) products and services set by market
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19. KNUT BLIND, THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS 89 (2004).
20. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 174 (1999).
21. Id. at 173-225.
22. SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS
CHANGE NATIONS 4-7 (1997).
23. Michelle Egan, Setting Standards: Strategic Advantages in International Trade, 13
BUS. STRATEGY REV., Mar. 2002, at 51, 52.
24. Id.
forces seem destined to increase.19 This increase will also place
pressure on legislators to grapple with the challenges of meshing
ICT standards with social regulation.
ARMT’s original mandate targets issues related to the distribu-
tion of copyrighted works over ICT networks. The hallmark of a
network is that its value increases with the number of users
connected to it, whether it is a real network (such as a railroad) or
a virtual network (created by many individuals using the same
ICT such as compact disk storage media).20 With regard to activities
that take place within information networks, strong positive and
negative externalities produce network effects that in turn create
strong pressure for convergence around a single network, product,
or standard.21 As a practical matter, ICT network-product inter-
operability can be achieved in a variety of ways, including through
the use of proprietary technologies, such as the Microsoft Windows
operating system, by means of reverse engineering, or the use of
standards. The use of standards often translates into significant
benefits for consumers, although there may be significant costs as
well.22 Common benefits include the simplification of complex
processes, increased economies of scale, reduction of information
asymmetries, and increased competition among vendors.23 Costs
may include reduction in product variety, increased risk of lock-in
to a particular problem-solving approach, and switching costs for
producers whose systems are incompatible with the standard.24 
There are also costs and benefits associated with attempts to
incorporate technical standards into regulation to change behavior.
Regulation by means of standards involves complex issues, includ-
ing whether the standard should target its objective directly or
indirectly by use of a proxy for the public interest involved; the
degree of specificity with which the standard is expressed; the choice
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25. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 103-14 (1982).
26. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROP. INTELL.], art. L331-5 (Fr.). An
earlier version of this narrative was previously published in Jane Winn & Nicolas Jondet, A
“New Approach” to Standards and Consumer Protection, 31 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 459 (2008).
27. M. CHRISTIAN VANNESTE, RAPPORT FAIT RELATIF AU DROIT D’AUTEUR ET AUX DRUITS
VOISINS DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ DE L’INFORMATION, RAPPORT NO. 2349, at 20-22 (2005), available at
http://www.assemblee-!ationale.fr/12/pdf/rapports/r2349.pdf [hereinafter RAPPORT NO. 2349].
28. Competitors have estimated that Apple controls 83 percent of the online music market
and 90 percent of the hard-drive based music player market. Thomas Claburn, Antitrust
Lawsuit Charges Apple with Monopolizing Online Music, INFORMATION WEEK, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal_tech/show/Article;html?articleID=205207
895.
29. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughts
onmusic/.
between performance standards, which describe goals generally, and
design standards, which are technology specific; whether compliance
with the standard should be mandatory or voluntary; and whether
the standard should express an aspirational goal beyond what
current technology can achieve or refer to existing technology.25 
I. REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR TECHNICAL MEASURES
A. The Interoperability Requirement
In 2006, France enacted DADVSI, which includes a requirement
that TPMs must not prevent effective interoperability between
digital file formats and the various software and devices on which
they can be played.26 French lawmakers were worried that a suc-
cessful proprietary TPM technology could become a de facto stan-
dard, locking in cultural goods consumers to the exclusive benefit of
the technology provider.27 French lawmakers were particularly
concerned about what was already happening in the field of digital
music distribution. Apple had been dominating the market both in
sales of digital music files, through its iTunes music store, and in
sales of portable media players, through its iPod player.28 Part of
this success stemmed from Apple’s strategy to use its exclusive TPM
technology, FairPlay, to tie the music sold on iTunes to the iPod
player.29 As a consequence, iPod owners who wished to buy digital
music could only get compatible files from iTunes. Conversely,
owners of digital players produced by another manufacturer could
556 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:547
30. RAPPORT NO. 2349, supra note 27, at 20-22.
31. The deadline for implementing the EUCD was December 22, 2002. See Directive
2001/29, supra note 8, at 19.
32. MICHEL THIOLLIÉRE, RAPPORT FAIT AU DROIT D’AUTEUR ET AUX DROITS VOISINS DANS
LA SOCIÉTÉ DE L’INFORMATION, RAPPORT NO. 308, at 145 (2006), available at http://www.
senat.fr/rap/l05-308/l05-3081.pdf [hereinafter RAPPORT NO. 308].
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id. at 146.
not play songs bought from Apple. Apple’s proprietary technology
was thus becoming the de facto standard for digital music distribu-
tion. French lawmakers believed that such a technology-based
monopoly in the cultural goods market would be detrimental to
consumers and the dissemination of, and equal access to, culture.30
To tackle this issue, the French Parliament had to be creative.
International instruments mandating the legal recognition and
protection of TPMs did not address the negative consequences TPMs
might have on consumer choice in the cultural goods market. The
WIPO Internet Treaties and the EUCD were drafted at a time when
TPM technology was still in its infancy and had yet to be deployed
on a large scale. Problems associated with TPMs first emerged only
a few years after the adoption of the international instruments
which legalized them. France had missed the December 2002 dead-
line for transposing the EUCD into national law, so by the time the
French lawmakers finally took up the matter in earnest in 2005, the
potential negative impact of TPMs on consumer choice had become
fully visible.31 
The French Parliament was under an international obligation
to legalize TPMs, but was also fully aware of the problems TPMs
created for consumers and thus tried to mitigate some of the
shortcomings of TPMs. The French Senate Committee argued that
although the EUCD did not itself contain provisions relating to
consumer issues, the recitals of the directive provided some legal
basis for an interoperability requirement.32 The Senate Committee
pointed to Recital 48, which states that the legal protection granted
to TPMs should not be limitless and notably that it “should respect
proportionality and should not prohibit those devices or activities
which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent the technical protection.”33 The Senate Committee also
pointed to Recital 54,34 which acknowledges that even though
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35. Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, Recital 54, at 15.
36. Id.
37. On technology-forcing legislation, see BREYER, supra note 25, at 106-07.
38. RAPPORT NO. 308, supra note 32, at 150-54.
39. Id. at 155.
“[i]mportant progress has been made in the international standard-
ization of [TPMs] ..., differences between [TPMs] could lead to an
incompatibility of systems within the Community.”35 Finally, Recital
54 encouraged the “[c]ompatibility and interoperability of the
different systems,” as well as “the development of global systems.”36
French lawmakers took the initiative to translate these mere
aspirations into a legal requirement. They decided that some form
of technology-forcing legislation was needed to compel recalcitrant
copyright owners and TPM vendors to support interoperability.37
The business community strongly opposed compulsory licensing, so
lawmakers adopted the less coercive requirement that TPMs should
interoperate instead. The parliamentary debate then focused on
determining which institution should be in charge of enforcing this
requirement.38 
B. The Inadequacy of Existing Institutions
One option was to let the civil courts implement interoperability,
as they have jurisdiction over intellectual property matters in
general and copyright issues in particular. However, lawmakers
deemed civil courts unsuitable to carry this task because they would
lack the expertise, speed, and secrecy required to deal with highly
sensitive and fast-evolving technologies. They also feared that civil
courts across the country could issue conflicting decisions, which
would only be resolved many years later by the Court of Cassation,
France’s highest court in civil and criminal matters. Such a long
time frame would be ill-suited for technological innovation.39 
Another avenue explored by Parliament would have been to en-
trust the French Competition Authority with the mission to enforce
the interoperability requirement. Indeed, choosing the Council on
Competition would have solved many of the issues associated with
civil courts. The Council is a single, centralized institution with
authority over all of France and is accustomed to handling and
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40. Autorité de la Concurrence, Reform of the French Competition Regulatory System:
The Conseil de la Concurrence Becomes the Autorité de la Concurrence, http://www.
autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=317 (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
41. Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision No. 04-D-54 of Nov. 9, 2004 ¶¶ 104-05 [hereinafter
Decision No. 04-D-54].
42. See generally Natali Helberger, Virgin Media Versus iTunes, INDICARE, Oct. 28, 2005,
http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=150.
43. VirginMega, Achat Musique en Ligne, http://www.virginmega.fr/accueil.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2009).
44. Decision No. 04-D-54, supra note 41, ¶¶ 6-7.
45. Id. ¶¶ 7-9.
46. Id. ¶ 65.
47. Id. ¶¶ 76-80.
guaranteeing the secrecy of sensitive information in competition
law matters.40 But unfortunately for French lawmakers, the
Council had already implicitly condoned the lack of TPM inter-
operability. 
In a 2004 decision, the Council ruled that Apple’s refusal to
license its TPM technology to its competitor, VirginMega, was not
an abuse of dominant position.41 The decision of the Council on
Competition is in itself very interesting.42 VirginMega, an online
platform offering music downloads,43 sued Apple for abuse of
dominant position. VirginMega was selling music protected by the
Windows DRM technology, which is incompatible with Apple’s very
popular iPod. In order to reach owners of iPods, VirginMega had
asked Apple to license its FairPlay technology.44 When Apple
refused, VirginMega launched a lawsuit before the Council on
Competition arguing that such refusal to license its technology
prevented would-be competitors from operating other download
platforms.45 For VirginMega, the FairPlay technology had become
so prevalent that it was essential to the success of any online music
platform.46 As a result, VirginMega and other services asserted that
they would have no chance to prosper by selling music incompatible
with the iPod. 
The question was thus whether access to Apple’s FairPlay tech-
nology was indispensable to online music platforms. The Council
concluded that it was not. First, the Council observed that, accord-
ing to studies conducted in 2004, French consumers predominantly
enjoyed their digital music on computers rather than on portable
devices.47 Importantly, computer users have access to the complete
2009] A NEW DEAL FOR END USERS? 559
48. Id. ¶¶ 81-85.
49. Id.
50. Id. ¶ 84.
51. Id. ¶ 82.
52. Id.
53. Id. ¶¶ 86-89.
54. Id. ¶¶ 104-05.
range of TPM-compliant media players, meaning that they are able
to read files protected by both the Windows DRM and FairPlay
technologies, albeit by using two different media players (Windows
Media Player and iTunes, respectively). Because computers can play
any type of TPM-protected music, no particular TPM is indispens-
able, as online platforms can choose amongst different technologies
to protect the content they distribute. Second, the competition
authority observed that consumers could easily and legally bypass
technological protections. The Council noted that there was a simple
way of transferring songs bought on VirginMega to an iPod: CD
burning.48 The Council gave a step-by-step explanation of the pro-
cess, instructing consumers to burn on a blank CD the songs they
had downloaded on VirginMega, then copy the songs back from the
CD onto their computer using an unprotected media file format such
as the MP3.49 The resulting MP3 files would then be playable on any
media device, including the iPod.50 The Council argued that this
solution was legal since all music platforms allowed songs to be
copied on a CD at least once.51 It also noted that the process
involved little extra cost (that of the blank CD) and was both well-
known and frequently used by digital consumers.52 VirginMega
consumers thus had the ability to make the songs they downloaded
compatible with the iPod. Lastly, the Council observed that the
market for portable media players was very competitive, with all
the competitors of the iPod, including VirginMega, using Microsoft
technology.53 The competition authority concluded that the FairPlay
technology was not indispensable for VirginMega to set up a suc-
cessful online platform; consequently, Apple’s refusal to license its
technology was not anticompetitive.54
When trying to decide which institution would be best suited to
enforce DADVSI’s new interoperability requirement, the French
Parliament observed that the Council decision was legally sound
and that, since then, no new element had emerged that would make
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55. RAPPORT NO. 308, supra note 32, at 152.
56. Jondet, supra note 10, at 483-84.
57. Ministère de la Culture et de la Comm’n, Projet de loi Favorisant la Diffusion et la
Protection de la Création sur Internet 4-6 (June 18, 2008), http://www.culture.gouv.fr/
culture/actualites/dossiers/internet-creation08/6%20-%20Projet%20de%20loi.pdf.
58. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE: CRÉATION SUR INTERNET (2008),
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/internet.asp.
59. In October 2008, the Senate adopted a first draft of the Creation and Internet Bill. See
Projet de loi Favorisant la Diffusion et la Protection de la Création sur Internet (2008),
http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas08-008.pdf. The lower house of Parliament started discussion of the
bill’s text in March 2009.
the Council reverse its decision.55 As a result, it was clear that if the
Council were mandated to enforce a new interoperability require-
ment, it would likely once again refuse to find a legal justification
to intervene in the market, thus making the whole exercise
pointless. 
C. The ARMT: Its Inherent Limitations and Impact
French lawmakers ultimately chose to create ARMT, a dedicated
independent administrative authority, to enforce the interoper-
ability requirement. ARMT was authorized to force a TPM owner to
disclose information essential to achieve interoperability, notably by
imposing huge fines.56
So far the mechanism has not been tested. No one has yet
challenged a supplier of TPMs before the ARMT. This is partly due
to ongoing changes in the structure of the Authority and partly to
the inherent limitations of the procedure before the ARMT. As of
2009, the ARMT was still not fully operational. Indeed, in 2008, the
French government introduced the Creation and Internet Bill in
Parliament to completely overhaul the ARMT by changing its name,
composition, and missions.57 Under the proposed legislation the
ARMT will be revamped into the High Authority for the Dissemina-
tion of Works and the Protection of Rights on the Internet (Haute
autorité pour la diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur
Internet or HADOPI).58 The HADOPI would be the cornerstone of
the so-called graduated response policy (also referred to as “three
strikes and you’re out”) under which repeat copyright offenders
could be disconnected from the Internet. Until the adoption of the
Creation and Internet Bill, which is expected to occur in late 2009,59
2009] A NEW DEAL FOR END USERS? 561
60. For a more complete analysis of HADOPI, see Nicolas Jondet, The French Copyright
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it seems unlikely that an interoperability case can be brought
before the authority.60
Even after the authority is fully functional, the strict rules
limiting the entities allowed to refer a case might ensure that no
interoperability case would ever be brought. Indeed, under the cur-
rent system, consumers and consumer groups are not allowed to
bring an interoperability claim before the authority. This option is
only open to some technology companies, namely software publish-
ers, manufacturers of technical systems, and services providers.61
The decision to exclude consumers from a process designed to pro-
tect them seems, at first, inconsistent. However, French lawmakers
argued that allowing the general public to have access to highly
confidential information about TPMs could compromise their
integrity.62 Technology companies were deemed to be more capable
of both safeguarding and using the essential information to achieve
interoperability. Nevertheless, excluding consumers from the pro-
cess could render the whole mechanism pointless if technology
companies enter a tacit pact of nonaggression. Once the authority
is up and running, it will be interesting to see which technology
company, if any, will bring the first interoperability case. 
In spite of these shortcomings, the French framework created by
DADVSI may have already had an impact on the global marketplace
for TPMs, at least in the field of digital music.63 DADVSI may have
played an important part in Apple’s decision in early 2007 to push
record labels to offer digital music without TPMs. Apple was
already facing strong opposition from consumers and legal chal-
lenges in the United States and Europe over its TPM technology,
and the prospect of dealing with French regulators could have been
the deciding factor in the company’s change of direction.64
DADVSI also clearly illustrates the intention of the French gov-
ernment and Parliament to address the consumer issues raised by
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TPMs. This concern for the interests of consumers of cultural goods
was also evident during the elaboration of the Creation and Internet
Bill. The Bill is the legal translation of a far-reaching agreement,
known as the Elysée Agreement, signed in November 2007 by the
French government, the copyright industry, and Internet services
providers.65 Under this agreement, the French government under-
takes to pass antipiracy legislation instituting a graduated response
mechanism. In exchange, the music industry notably undertakes to
suppress all noninteroperable TPMs from their catalogues of online
French music within a year after the implementation of the grad-
uated response mechanism.66 From the point of view of the govern-
ment, the policy objectives are clear: punishing copyright infringers
whilst helping legitimate consumers by making the legal offer of
cultural goods more user-friendly. By early 2009, France was the
only country in Europe to take concrete steps toward enacting a
three strikes law to punish end users engaged in peer-to-peer file
sharing. The European Parliament and several other European
countries considered such legislation in 2008 but rejected it as an
unwarranted interference in individual rights.67 If the Creation and
Internet Bill is adopted, and the HADOPI agency undertakes its
new three strikes authority with the enthusiasm that content
producers in France and in other countries would like, its role in
enforcing traditional intellectual property rights may quickly
overshadow its responsibilities for protecting the consumer interest
in interoperability of media devices. 
Although ARMT’s mandate still preserves beneficial copyright
limitations for French consumers of cultural goods, there has been
even less progress on this front than on the interoperability front.
This apparent loss of enthusiasm is less surprising than it might
first appear, however, when put in the larger context of French
copyright law and policy generally. Even though French consumers
65. MINISTÉRE DE LA CULTURE, “ACCORDS DE L’ELYSEE”: UN ACCORD HISTORIQUE QUI
PROFITE AUX CONSOMMATEURS AUTANT QU’AUX ARTISTES, DESTINÉ À FAIRE DU PIRATAGE UN
RISQUE INUTILE 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/dossiers/
internet-creation08/Accords_Fiche%20explicative.pdf.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Sean Michaels, France Votes for “Three Strikes” Filesharing Law, THE GUARDIAN, Nov.
4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2008/nov/04/french-filesharing-legislation. For a
more complete analysis of HADOPI, see Jondet, supra note 60.
2009] A NEW DEAL FOR END USERS? 563
68. Dugie Standeford, French Industry Attacks Private Copy Fees as Levy Debate Grows,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/11/16/french-
industry-attacks-private-copy-fees-as-levy-debate-grows/.
69. Cour de cassation [Cass.1e civ.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], June 19, 2008,
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currently pay a levy on blank recording media to finance a fund to
compensate copyright owners for private copying,68 the Court of
Cassation recently adopted a very restrictive interpretation of what
the private copy exception means under French copyright law.69 The
French consumer advocacy organization UFC-Que Choisir, together
with a consumer known as Stéphane P., brought the suit to clarify
the scope of the French consumer’s right to make private copies.70
Stéphane P. had purchased a film in DVD format and wanted to
make a copy in VHS form because his parents did not have a DVD
player, but he was prevented from doing so due to the anticopy
protection on the DVD.71 The Court of Cassation ruled against the
consumer by ruling that private copying was an exception, not a
right. Not only were copyright holders entitled to use TPMs to
prevent private copying, but consumers were not even entitled to
spontaneously challenge such use. The private copying exception,
said the Court of Cassation, could only be used as a defense in a
copyright infringement case and not as an affirmative cause of
action.72 It is important to note that the case was decided by
application of copyright law as it was decided prior to the adoption
of DADVSI. One of the aims of DADVSI was to offer some guaran-
tees that the use of TPMs would not deprive consumers of the
benefit of copyright exceptions such as the private copying excep-
tion. After DADVSI, consumers and consumer groups can refer a
case before the ARMT arguing that TPMs unduly prevent them
from benefiting from copyright exceptions. However, if consumers
564 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:547
73. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111-12 (1938). 
74. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) (asserting that the
expanded role of the state in regulating the economy triggered by the Industrial Revolution
took place under the guise of “self-regulating” markets). 
75. Rabin, supra note 13, at 1194. The ICC was established February 4, 1887, by the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and abolished in 1996 by the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
now have an affirmative cause for action before the ARMT, this does
not mean that the ARMT will rule in their favor. The ARMT could
still decide that TPMs should prevail over private copying in order
to safeguard the economic interests of copyright holders. 
II. INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN AMERICA AND FRANCE
The independent regulatory agency is one of the hallmarks of
modern economic regulation.73 The growth in the scale and complex-
ity of economic activity associated with the Industrial Revolution
gave rise to social conflicts beyond the power of traditional executive
branch institutions to resolve.74 Just as independent regulatory
agencies emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to
radical changes in economic institutions, new forms of regulation
are now emerging in response to radical changes in economic
institutions triggered by the information revolution that began in
the late twentieth century. Social conflicts arising between private
business models and the public interest in access to digital content
and interoperability of different devices may be a challenge beyond
the ability of traditional regulatory agencies to resolve. ARMT is a
modest but novel attempt to resolve those conflicts within a new
form of regulatory institution. In order to put its modest scale and
impact into perspective, it may be useful to remember the difficult
process that first established the competency and legitimacy of
traditional independent regulatory agencies. 
A. Independent Regulatory Agencies in America
The first independent regulatory agency, the ICC, was estab-
lished in 1887 to regulate prices and eliminate what was then seen
as unfair discrimination among railroad customers.75 Although the
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ICC later served as the model for other independent regulatory
agencies in America, including the Federal Trade Commission and
the Federal Communications Commission,76 controversy surrounded
its creation. As a result, its initial mandate was limited in scope.77
The ICC was created to deal with the chaos caused by unregulated
competition among railroads, which at that time were the economic
backbone of the country. Although there was widespread consensus
in the 1880s that the federal government had to do something to
solve the railroad problem, there were deep political divisions
among advocates of different strategies.78 The compromise that
created the ICC required the Commission to defer to the courts in
enforcement matters and did not grant it authority to set prices,
only to investigate unfair practices by railroads and to issue cease
and desist orders.79 Early Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
scope of ICC power limited it further.80 Soon after the turn of the
century, however, the Supreme Court began grudgingly to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of the ICC and exercised more restraint in
reviewing its decisions.81 
It was not until the second phase of the New Deal in 1935, and
President Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Supreme Court following
his 1936 reelection, that the authority of the ICC and other in-
dependent regulatory agencies was established beyond question in
the United States.82 The legitimacy of independent regulatory
agencies in the United States hit a high water mark in the decades
following World War II, only to come under broad assault in the
1960s and 1970s due to widespread public skepticism about the
integrity of agency processes.83 Then the Reagan Revolution in the
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1980s led to the embrace of deregulation which continued through
the 2000s.84 This resurgence of American skepticism toward central
government regulation of the economy caused administrative law in
the United States to revert to something resembling its nineteenth-
century roots: deference to private rights and market incentives as
the primary response to economic challenges, followed by a prefer-
ence for local regulation over central regulation.85
ARMT has some of the classic features of an independent
regulatory agency: it is made up of six members who are all inde-
pendent from the French government and exercise their authority
as an independent collegial body. It is authorized to render opinions
to resolve specific complaints regarding TPMs. It is also in charge
of monitoring technical and legal developments affecting TPMs and
may suggest appropriate changes in the law. It cannot, however,
mandate the adoption of technical specifications to TPM providers.
This is very similar to the ICC’s original grant of authority. The ICC
was not permitted to issue prospective guidance in the form of
maximum prices until 1906, or minimum prices until 1920, but only
to investigate and provide a very modest response to specific
instances of unfair competition.86 The Supreme Court initially
interpreted the scope of judicial review of ICC determinations so
broadly that the ICC did little more than conduct investigations
until its authority was strengthened by Congress in the early
twentieth century.87 Given that ARMT is barely a year old, the
history of the ICC suggests it is too soon to predict how effective
ARMT may ultimately be in protecting consumers in global ICT
markets. Although ARMT has not yet issued any opinions, Apple
switched its policy regarding TPMs following the enactment of
DADVSI, possibly in response to the French legislation.88
In some respects, the current controversy surrounding consumer
use of ICT technologies and digital content mirrors the railroad
problem of nineteenth-century America in that a large but relatively
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weak social group is seeking legislation to block attempts by a more
powerful group to exploit its unequal bargaining power. Both
controversies were created by the unregulated growth of economic
institutions that manifest some characteristics of public goods: in
the case of railroads, a national transportation system; in the case
of digital content, a global ICT market architecture. However, the
nineteenth-century railroad problem in the United States repre-
sented a desperate struggle by farmers for their economic survival
in the face of predatory practices by suppliers and lenders.89 Before
the ICC was created in 1887, the pervasive sense of crisis among
American farmers led to widespread political agitation and mass
movements including the Grange Movement and the Farmers
Alliance.90 
The controversy surrounding the scope of copyright, including the
scope limitations such as private copying or fair use, is part of the
battle of traditional copyright industries to survive in the face of
rapid technological innovation. DADVSI and ARMT reflect efforts
by France to define the proper scope of private intellectual property
rights and the public interest in ready access to cultural goods and
to retain national economic sovereignty in the face of growing global
integration of ICT markets. The French approach to this issue
differs markedly from the American approach, in part because of the
radically different historical experiences of government regulation
in the United States and France.91
B. Independent Regulatory Agencies in France
During the French Revolution, France established a strict pro-
hibition on judicial review of legislative action, which substantially
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remains in place today.92 After Napoleon took power in 1799, he
strengthened the executive branch of government and established
the Conseil d’Etat, modeled loosely on the Ancien Régime Conseil du
Roi, which also remains in place today.93 In 1806, a special unit was
established within the Conseil d’Etat to hear public complaints
regarding executive action and preserve the strict separation of
powers; this unit was later expanded to a complete system of
administrative tribunals.94 However, the French tradition of strong
central government regulation of markets was established before
Napoleon by Louis XIV (1654-1715) and his finance minister, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert, who served from 1665-1683.95
The French system for judicial review of administrative law is
thus radically different from the common law system generally,
which presumes that review of executive action will take place
within the conventional court system,96 and the U.S. variant of the
common law system, which provides for a particularly invasive
form of judicial review.97 The difference between the two systems
was so great that Albert Venn Dicey, the great British constitutional
scholar, could plausibly assert in the early twentieth century that
Britain had no administrative law (taking the French system as the
exemplar of administrative law) and that the French system fos-
tered tyranny whereas the British model of treating the state as a
private party within the conventional court system fostered civil
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liberties.98 Dicey’s criticisms notwithstanding, the French model of
administrative law has been more influential than either the U.K.
or U.S. variants of the common law approach to administrative law,
and many of its elements have been widely copied in Europe and
Latin America.99 Because the French system of administrative law
was so highly developed, France resisted the creation of independ-
ent regulatory agencies much longer than did the U.K.100 Although
the legitimacy of independent regulatory agencies has always been
and remains problematic even under U.S. law,101 the legitimacy of
independent regulatory authorities under French law appears to be
even more uncertain, given the background of two centuries of
strong central government with strict separation of judicial and
executive functions.102
The distinction between public law and private law is also gen-
erally more sharply drawn in French law than in the common law
because market regulation is based on the notion of “ordre publique
économique.” Although this notion originally signified something
like market law and order, it has expanded over time to include
twentieth-century concepts such as government planning and
regulation of distribution systems.103 Given the French tradition
of strong government supervision of market behavior, it is not
surprising that France would be the first developed market econ-
omy to attempt to regulate TPM. Within the French framework of
administrative law, assigning an independent regulatory agency
to accomplish this task is a distinctly cosmopolitan and modern
approach to information economy regulation.104
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Given the modern French tradition of economic dirigisme, it is not
surprising that the French are the first to try to regulate the
interoperability of TPM. However, it is surprising that the French
granted that authority to an independent regulatory authority in
lieu of the French executive branch of government. It was not until
1978 that the Data Protection Commission (Commission nationale
de l’informatique and des libertés or CNIL), the first truly inde-
pendent modern regulatory authority, was established in France,
although regulatory commissions with oversight of securities
markets and banks had been established a decade earlier.105 As a
practical matter, the growth in recent decades in the number of
independent regulatory agencies in France reflects a desire for legal
realism in lieu of the legal formalism often characteristic of French
bureaucracy, for regulators with specialized expertise in lieu of
generalist functionaries, and innovative, new governance institu-
tions in response to rapid social change.106 The need to regulate
some of the new forms of economic activity emerging in recent
decades justifies the creation of independent regulatory authorities
in France. Independent regulatory authorities protect citizens and
regulated entities from arbitrary exercises of power by bureaucrats,
increase respect for new social values such as government trans-
parency and freedom of information, and provide independent
oversight of certain traditional government functions.107 
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When the text of DADVSI was debated, there was discussion of
giving authority over TPM interoperability to a technical com-
mittee (commission de normalisation of AFNOR, the French na-
tional standards body),108 or a college of mediators (College des
médiateurs) along the lines of the Cinema Mediator (médiateur du
cinéma).109 Nevertheless, the final legislation specifies that ARMT
should be an independent regulatory authority. Since the law was
enacted, however, progress in establishing ARMT has proceeded
slowly. ARMT has only a few staff members and, according to its
2008 Annual Report, its activities have consisted mostly of gather-
ing information from relevant stakeholders.110 Whether this is
merely the conventional pace for establishing a new governmental
entity in France, or is due to the fact that no businesses have
decided to challenge any of the most widely used TPM systems
(CSS, AACS, FairPlay, or Windows DRM), or the decision of some
copyright owners to abandon the use of TPM remains unclear. As
long as ARMT survives, however, there is a chance that things
might change. Should the government and the Parliament remain
unsatisfied with the way TPMs are deployed in the marketplace,
they would just need to tweak the existing statutory and regulatory
framework of the DADVSI law to put pressure on TPM providers to
achieve interoperability. Indeed, a change in the law to allow
consumers and consumer groups to bring an interoperability case
before the ARMT would probably spur TPM providers to reach
agreements over interoperability rather than face litigation from
consumer groups.
III. TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND REGULATION
Technical standards have played an important role in rationaliz-
ing the industrial economy. The importance of this role is often
reflected in the integration of standards into modern economic and
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The European Union is aggressively and successfully promoting its technology
and practices to other nations around the world through its own standards
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social regulation.111 Because technological innovation may proceed
at a faster pace than law reform, one challenge facing regulators
who wish to harness the administrative impact of standardization
is how to make use of specific standards without creating new
problems of obsolescence and inefficiency that are more serious than
the ones regulation was intended to correct. The U.S. experience of
technology-forcing regulations issued in connection with environ-
mental laws enacted in the 1970s has colored perceptions of
regulation and technical standards for industry in America ever
since.112 As a result, businesses in the United States staunchly
oppose most attempts to incorporate technical standards for
industry in regulations, preferring to leave the development and
adoption of standards in the hands of hundreds of different private
standard setting organizations. By contrast, since the 1980s, the
European experience of harmonizing regulation and technical
standards for industry has generally been positive. This reaction is
a result of the New Approach to standardization, discussed further
below. European coordination with international standards organi-
zations such as ISO and outreach efforts targeting developing
countries have increased the popularity of EU technical standards
for industry around the world.113
With regard to ICT standards, however, the U.S. private sector
approach has enjoyed a decisive tactical advantage in global mar-
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kets, overshadowing most European efforts to set global ICT
standards.114 The U.S. approach to ICT standard setting is unique
in its emphasis on innovation and the rapid commercialization of
innovation, as well as its lack of attention to social regulations, such
as data protection laws, which tend to increase production costs. In
the global regulatory competition to shift the architecture of the
global information infrastructure in a direction that benefits a
particular national economy, the U.S. laissez-faire approach to the
growth of the information economy is being exported around the
world, embedded in smart products that were not designed to ac-
commodate social values such as universal access or data protection.
The ARMT is an independent regulatory agency created to promote
one of those social values, interoperability, in a technology that was
developed to protect private property rights rather than advance
any collective public interest. The conventional means of achieving
interoperability in ICT markets is through standards; the gover-
nance structure of those standards may range from proprietary
technology controlled by a single vendor to open public standards
created through transparent international processes. The focus of
ARMT is now limited to ex post dispute resolution among a small
number of competing service providers and products and does not
yet influence or mandate any technical standards. The history of
the ICC suggests, however, that with time, the scope of ARMT’s
authority, or the authority of an independent regulatory agency like
it established in another country or at the EU level, may one day
expand to include some form of oversight of ICT standards to ensure
that their implementation serves specific public interests other than
interoperability, such as universal access or data protection.
Defining the relationship between technical standards and reg-
ulation in ICT markets is certainly more difficult than in markets
for industrial products, although defining the relationship between
technical standards and regulation in industrial markets is not by
any means easy. Notwithstanding the difficulty of formalizing the
relationship between relatively static legal rules and highly dy-
namic markets for ICT standards and products, the need to insert
the public interest ex ante, when standards are first developed,
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rather than ex post, when those standards are implemented in
products sold to end users, may be greater with technical standards
for industrial products. This is because technical standards define
the market for ICT products to a much greater degree than do
technical standards for industrial products. Once a market has
formed around certain standards, the practical difficulty of shifting
an entire market may be even greater than the problems of
modifying one line of products to bring them into conformity with
standards.
Although ARMT’s authority is now limited to addressing inter-
operability issues ex post, in the future its authority might be
expanded to address interoperability issues ex ante. The ongoing
conflict between the European Commission and Microsoft sug-
gests that ex post remedies to achieve interoperability may be
ineffective.115 The most obvious strategy for switching from an ex
post strategy to an ex ante one would be to grant ARMT some
authority in the development and recognition of technical standards.
One legislative model for integrating technical standards with
regulation while preserving enough flexibility to accommodate
innovation and diversity is the New Approach to European stan-
dardization developed in the 1980s to support the development of
the internal market.116 Although the New Approach addresses
issues related to industrial product standards, not ICT standards,
it might be possible to adapt selected elements of the New Approach
legislative framework to ICT standards issues. In 2008, the
European Commission launched a public policy dialogue on the need
for new European responses to the encroachment of American ICT
standards into European markets, as the American ICT standard
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development system has often overshadowed established European
approaches to ICT standard developing.117 Within the context of that
policy dialogue, novel approaches to harmonizing ICT standards and
European economic regulation may emerge, which could then
inform the exercise of ex ante authority by ARMT.
CONCLUSION
Will ARMT eventually usher in a New Deal for end users of ICT
technologies by advancing the cause of social regulation into new
economic arenas? It certainly seems unlikely now, but two years
after the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, it also
looked like the ICC was doomed to irrelevance. Like the ICC, ARMT
was the product of political compromises and governmental am-
bivalence that have deprived its current operations of much vigor
or coherence. The scope of ARMT’s mandate to insure the inter-
operability of TPMs has proven to be so narrow as to be almost
nonexistent, and it seems unable to protect copyright limitations
from being eroded by TPMs. It took two decades, however, for the
ICC to assume its full modern role as regulator of the American
transportation industry, and only after three decades under the
New Deal was its legitimacy finally established. Even if ARMT’s
status evolves at Internet time instead of Guilded Age time, it may
still take a few years before it is clear whether ARMT has succeeded
in achieving its original mandate.
If the policy objective behind the creation of ARMT was the
protection of consumer interests in copyright limitations and
interoperability, then it may be necessary not merely to provide an
ex post dispute resolution procedure, but also to deal with technical
standards. Managing the interface between technical standards and
economic regulation is never easy, and the convergence of national
economies in global ICT markets has made the interface even
more difficult to manage. The American experience with the use of
technical standards to support enforcement of the Clean Air Act
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continues to cast a pall over American thinking about the use of
technical standards to support regulation in other areas. By
contrast, the European experience with the New Approach to
standardization provides European regulators with an example of
successful integration of product standards with product regulations
that helped fuel the growth of the internal market. Although ARMT
may ultimately provide French consumers with little protection
from consortia standards and proprietary technologies that interfere
with their enjoyment of media technologies, it may nevertheless
provide an interesting example of new hybrid forms of consumer
protection regulations that leverage technical standards as well as
legal norms to advance consumer interests. That is, unless the
ARMT, reborn as the HADOPI, enjoys more success in its missions
to deter piracy than as an authority to safeguard the interests of
consumers of digital cultural goods.
